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ABSTRACT 
Cloud computing is a service model enabling resources limited mobile devices to remotely execute tasks on the clouds. 
The Mobile Agent is a software program on behalf of the software installed in the mobile device to negotiate with other 
mobile agents in the clouds, which provides a diversity of automated negotiation based applications in Mobile Commences. 
However, the negotiation plans carried by mobile agents are easily be eavesdropped by the malicious cloud platforms, since 
the codes of mobile agents are read and executed on the cloud platform. Thus, the sellers can take cheat actions to increase 
their profits, which is to tailor the negotiation plans to seize buyers’ profits after eavesdropping on buyers’ negotiation plans. 
In this paper, we consider the buyers can take actions to resist the sellers’ cheatings, that is the buyers can tailor their plans 
with extremely low demands before migrate to the cloud platform. Above situations are modeled as a mathematical model, 
called the Eavesdropping and Resistance of Negotiation (ERN) Game. We develop a simulator to simulate an artificial 
market for analyzing the behaviors on ERN Game. The simulation results show buyers’ resistances deter sellers from 
cheating and cooperative strategies are adopted by buyers and sellers. 
. 
Keywords 
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INTRODUCTION 
Cloud Computing is an emerging service model enabling mobile devices utilizing the cloud resources to reduce the energy 
consumptions and to execute diverse services on the clouds. A Mobile Agent is a software program having the ability to be 
executed in the clouds on behalf of the software installed in the resources limited mobile devices such as PDA, smart phone, 
or tablet PC to remotely execute jobs or to interact with other mobile agents. Integrating the mobile agents into the clouds, 
the mobile devices have the ability to execute a diversity of applications for Mobile Commerce (Aversa et al., 2010, Shih et 
al., 2007, Oberheide et al., 2008). 
The mobile agents are able to negotiate with other mobile agents on behalf of users (Fasli, 2007, Bartolini et al., 2005). 
The mobile agents are thus used to build services in Mobile Commerce (Tsaur, 2012, An et al., 2010). Security is one of the 
most important considerations in the mobile agent based applications (Cavalcante et al., 2012). It is generally agreed that the 
mobile agents are hard to prevent the eavesdropping attack form cloud platform (Oberheide et al., 2008, Dadhich, 2010). 
When the mobile agents dispatched to a malicious cloud, the malicious cloud can eavesdrop on the negotiation plan carried 
by the mobile agents, which is called the “Malicious cloud eavesdropping attack”.  It is hard to prevent such attacks from two 
facts: (1) The malicious cloud can read and execute any instruction of the mobile agent (Adane, 2007). (2) The malicious 
cloud can eavesdrop in the interception or secret communications of mobile agents (Cavalcante, 2012). 
Based on “Malicious cloud eavesdropping attack”, the sellers’ mobile agents can cheat buyers’ mobile agents in 
negotiation to seize buyers’ profits according to negotiation plans of buyers’ agents discoursed by malicious cloud platform. 
As illustration in Fig. 1, a buyers’ mobile agent is executed on the malicious cloud platform on behalf of the software 
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installed in the mobile device for negotiation with other mobile agents. The malicious cloud can eavesdrop over the buyers’ 
negotiation plans and disclose them to the sellers’ mobile agents. Thus, the seller’s mobile agent can tailor its negotiation 
plan to seize buyer’s profits. Knowing sellers may cheat in negotiations, a buyer can resist seller’s cheating by adjustment of 
his negotiation plan with extremely low demand (i.e., very low demand price) before migrating to the cloud platform in order 
to decrease the deal price in negotiation for decreasing the sellers’ profits. The above resistance from buyers may make the 
sellers adopt honest strategies.  
Since cheating behaviors will discourage people for using mobile agents based negotiation applications on the clouds, it 
is necessary to study following two research questions in above-mentioned buyers’ resistance against the sellers’ cheating: (1) 
What is the analytic behavior model of buyers and sellers? (2) What are the strategies co-evolved by buyers and sellers?  
Aiming at Question (1), we model the above situations between buyers and sellers as a Normal-Form Game in Game 
Theory (Branzei, 2008), which is called Eavesdropping and Resistance of Negotiation game (ERN game). The ERN game is 
helpful for analyzing the strategies adopted by buyers and sellers with their corresponding utilizations. Aiming at the 
Question (2), we develop a simulator to simulate an artificial market consisting of buyers and sellers on the ERN game, based 
on the Trade Network Game model developed McFadzean and Tesfatsion (2001). The simulation results show the buyers’ 
resistances will deter from sellers’ cheating behaviors and the cooperative strategies of buyers and sellers will be emerged. 
Figure 1. Illustration of malicious cloud eavesdropping attack. 
Most of researches studying behaviors in negotiations focus on the human based negotiations. The analysis results of the 
researches are based on the assumption that the negotiation plans are unknown due to the nature of human. However, this 
assumption may be unsuitable for computer-assisted negotiations. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to 
study the behaviors on negotiations, under the assumption that the negotiation plans are known. We formally define the 
model and perform simulation of the behaviors of buyers and sellers in the ERN game. In the following sections, we will first 
define the model of the ERN game. And then, we present the simulation results of behaviors of the artificial market on the 
ERN game, based on our simulator. The last section is the conclusion of this study.  
 
EAVESDROPPING AND RESISTANCE OF NEGOTIATION GAME 
We first introduce some preliminaries and then model the misbehavior and the resilience between the buyers and sellers. 
In the last subsection, we formally formulate the Eavesdropping and Resistance of Negotiation (ERN) game.  
Preliminaries 
Negotiation is a series of stages for seeking an agreement point for multiple negotiation issues. One agreement point 
represents a point in the multiple dimensional space, where each dimension represents one negotiable issue, such as price, 
quality, etc. An agent has a set of options in the multidimensional space. When the agreement is successful made in the 
negotiation, one agreement point will be decided by the agents. The preference of an agent is modeled as a utilization 
function for valuing its options. An option for an agent is vector P = [p1, p2, …, pN], where N is the number of the negotiable 
issues. 
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The utilization of an option x for an agent i is detonated by Ui (x), where agent i is a buyer agent or a seller agent. In the 
end of negotiation, the agents will make a deal agreement at the agreement point (x*), where utilization Ui (x*) is maximized 
for each agent i at the same option x*. 
A negotiation example is illustrated in Fig. 2, which has one negotiation issue (price) between buyers and sellers. The 
utilization of price functions for a buyer agent and a seller agent are denoted by Ub and Us, respectively. The Ub is a 
monotonic decreasing function, and Us is a monotonic decreasing function. Moreover, an option P* is the agreement option 
belonging to the options of buyer agent and the options of seller agent. 
 
Fig.  2. Relationship between Utilization and Price for a seller and a buyer in negotiation 
 
Now, we define the negotiation process in negotiation. The buyer agent carries on the negotiation plan with the price range 
[    
 ,     
 ,] and the seller agent has the negotiation plan with the price range [    
 ,    
 ]. The    
  and     
   (    
  and     
  ) 
are the minimum price and the maximum price of a buyer (seller) agent. The buyer agent will negotiate with the sellers from 
    
  to     
  and the seller agent will negotiate with buyers from     
  to     
 , as illustrated in Fig. 3. In a number of rounds, 
they are able to make a deal agreement at the price P* before deadline. 
Fig.  3. Illustration of negotiation with deadline between the buyer agent and the seller agent. This example shows the 
seller and the buyer make an agreement at the agreement pint P* before deadline. 
 
Behaviors Analysis of Buyers and Sellers 
The seller’s cheating and the buyer’s resistances are modeled in this subsection. Each buyer agent has two possible 
actions: the honest action and the cheating action. Each buyer agent also has the same two possible actions. 
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1. [Cheating action of seller]: The cheating action of the seller means the seller submits an adjusted negotiation plan 
with lower price to seize buyer’s profit on eavesdropping on buyers’ negotiation plans.  
2. [Honest action of seller]: The honest action of the seller means the seller submits a true negotiation plan to negotiate 
with buyer. 
3. [Cheating action of buyer]:  The cheating action of the buyer means it submits an adjusted negotiation plan with 
extremely lower prices. 
4. [Honest action of buyer]: The honest action of the buyer means the buyer submits its true negotiation plan to 
negotiate with sellers. 
 
There are four possible cases between the buyer and the seller, which are analyzed as follows. 
 
Case 1: Honest Buyer vs Honest Seller  
 
In this case, the buyer and the seller will make the deal agreement at the regular price PHH. The utilization of the seller is 
UB(PHH) and the utilization of buyer is US(PHH), as shown  in Fig. 4 (a). 
Fig.  4. Illustration of four possible cases between the seller and the buyer. 
 
Case 2: Honest Buyer vs Cheating Seller 
 
In this case, the buyer submits its true negotiation plan, but the seller submits its adjusted negotiation plan with higher 
price to seize the buyer’s profit, as illustrated in Fig. 4(b). The deal agreement is made at the price PHC. Compared with the 
case 1, the deal price of deal agreement is increased. The relationship of the prices between the case 2 and the case 1 as 
follows. 
 
PHC > PHH            (7) 
 
The buyer’s utilization is UB(PHC) and the seller’s utilization is US(PHC). Since the utilization function UB of the buyer is 
monotonically decreasing and the utilization function of the seller is monotonically increased, the relationship of the 
utilizations of the buyer and the seller is as follows. 
 
UB(PHC) < UB(PHH)            (8) 
 
US(PHC) > US(PHH)           (9) 
 
Case 3: Cheating Buyer vs Honest Seller 
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In this case, the buyer submits his adjusted negotiation plan with extremely lower price, but the seller submits its true 
negotiation plan. The deal agreement is made at the price PCH as illustration in Fig. 4(c), where the buyer’s utilization is 
UB(PCH) and the seller’s utilization is US(PCH). The relationship of the deal prices between the case 3 and the case 1 is as 
follows. 
 
PCH < PHH            (10) 
 
The buyer’s utilization is UB(PCH) and the seller’s utilization is US(PCH). Since the utilization function UB of buyer is 
monotonically increasing and the utilization function US of the seller is monotonically decreased, the relationship of 
utilization functions of the buyer and the seller is as follows.  
 
UB(PCH) > UB(PHH)            (11) 
 
US(PCH) < US(PHH)           (12) 
 
Case 4: Cheating Buyer vs Cheating Seller 
 
In this case, the buyer submits an adjusted negotiation plan with extremely lower prices, and the seller also submits its 
adjusted negotiation plan with lower prices. The deal agreement is made at the price PCC as illustration in Fig. 4(d), and the 
buyer’s utilization is UB(PCC) and the seller’s utilization is US(PCC). The deal price of the deal agreement will be increased, so 
the relationship of the prices between the case 4 and the case 1 is as follows. 
 
PCC < PHH         `   (13) 
 
Since the utilization function of buyer (UB) is monotonic decreasing and the utilization function of seller (US) is 
monotonic increasing, the utilization of the buyer will be lower and the utilization of the seller will be higher. 
 
UB(PHH) < UB(PCC)            (14) 
 
US(PHH) > US(PCC)           (15) 
 
Modeling of ERN Game 
The payoff table of the ERN Game is defined in Table 1. And, the relationship of the utilizations of the buyer and the 
seller in the four cases are summarized in Eqs (16) – (19).  
Table  1. Payoff Table 
        Seller 
Buyer 
Honest Cheat 
Honest UB(PHH), US(PHH) UB(PHC), US(PHC) 
Cheat UB(PCH), US(PCH) UB(PCC), US(PCC) 
(1) Buyer’s Utilization 
 
UB(PHC) < UB(PHH) < UB(PCH)          (16) 
 
UB(PHH) < UB(PCC)           (17) 
 
(2) Seller’s Utilization 
 
US(PCH) < US (PHH) < US(PHC)          (18) 
 
US(PCC) < US(PHH)           (19) 
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SIMULATIONS 
In this section, we simulate an artificial market for analyzing the co-evolutionary of strategies in the ERN game. The 
economics model is based on the Trade Network Game model, which consists of buyers and sellers for simulating the trade 
market. We develop a simulator based on the Trade Network Game model by McFadzean and Tesfatsion (2001), to simulate 
a artificial market consisting of buyers and sellers playing ERN game for analyzing their behaviors.  
In the simulation, we simulate a virtual market, which has 10 sellers and 10 buyers. The simulation runs 3000 trading 
iterations, where buyers and sellers evolve their strategies within 30 generations. In each generation, the 90 percent elite 
agents will be selected into the next generation. The payoffs of buyers and sellers in playing ERN game are listed in Table 2. 
Table 2. Payoff Table used in the Simulations 
        Seller 
Buyer 
Honest Cheat 
Honest 4, 4 0, 5 
Cheat 5, 0 1, 1 
 
The strategies adopted by the buyers and the sellers are analyzed in the simulations, as shown in Fig.5. The buyers and 
sellers evolve their strategies by generation to generation. We evaluate the strategies adopted by buyers and sellers by four 
types. Type 1 is: honest buyers and honest sellers. Type 2 is: honest buyers and cheating sellers. Type 3 is: cheating buyers 
and honest sellers. Type 4 is: cheat buyers and cheat sellers. 
The simulation results of strategies adopted by buyers and sellers are shown in Fig. 5. In beginning, many types are 
emerged. After a number of generations, the type 4 (both honest) strategy are become dominated and no further changed. The 
simulation implies that cooperative (both honest) strategies will be adopted by buyers and sellers in the ERN Game. 
Fig.  5. Evaluation of strategies adopt of buyers and sellers.  
 
CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we study the problem about the behaviors of negotiation plans carried by mobile agents are easily to be 
eavesdropped on the malicious cloud platforms. Two research questions in buyers’ resistance to resist the sellers’ cheating 
are studied: (1) What is an analytic behavior model of buyers and sellers? (2) What are the strategies co-evolved by buyers 
and sellers? Aiming at the Question (1), we model above situations between buyers and sellers as Eavesdropping and 
Resistance of Negotiation Game (ERN Game). Aiming at the Question (2), we develop a simulator to simulate an artificial 
market consisting of buyers and sellers on the ERN Game, based on the Trade Network Game model. The simulation results 
show the buyers’ resistances will deter from sellers’ cheating behaviors and the cooperative strategies will be adopted by 
buyers and sellers. 
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Most of researches in studying behaviors of negotiation mainly focus on human based negotiations; however, our focus 
is the computer assisted based negotiation. With growth of integration of cloud computing and mobile commerce, automatic 
negotiations with the intelligent technologies, such as mobile agent technology, will be getting popular in the modern mobile 
commences; They will, however, result in a variety of new behavior models, different from the traditional human based 
negotiations. In the future, we will further study a variety of behaviors caused by adopting new technologies. 
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